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The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's
Ethical and Political Writings*
PAUL A. VANDER WAERDT
My objective here is to reconstruct the plan of Aristotle's exposition of
political science ipolitike) in his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and to
show that this plan reveals certain fundamental but unnoticed features of his
philosophical intention. First I demonstrate, on the basis of numerous
programmatic but unfulfilled forward references in the extant Politics, that
Aristotle planned to complete this work in certain promised "discourses on
the regimes" (Pol. 1260b8-20) by reconsidering his accounts of moral
virtue, education and household management from the perspective of the
different forms of regime and the divergent ends each promotes. Secondly, I
explore the philosophical intention of this plan of politike, arguing that
Aristotle's enquiry remains fundamentally incomplete without this
reconsideration. His aim of providing the statesman with the knowledge of
"legislative science" necessary to apply the teaching on the human good
presented in the ethical writings, I suggest, requires this promised account of
the way in which the moral virtues vary according to the ends promoted by
the different forms of regime. Our enquiry will help to clarify the
philosophical significance of Aristotle's conception of "ethics," as tradition
has come to know it, as political science.'
*This paper has a long history: I first conceived many of the views here presented when
I studied Aristotle's political thought with David O'Connor in 1984, and I remain indebted
to him for much valuable discussion over the years. This paper was first presented at Duke
University in December 1988, as part of a lecture series on Aristotle, and a subsequent
version was read to the seminar in Traditional and Modem Philosophy at The University of
Sydney in September 1990. I am grateful to these audiences, as well as to Michael Frede,
Phillip Mitsis and A. E. Raubitschek, for helpful suggestions. Particular thanks are due to
my late colleague in Chapel Hill, Friedrich Solmsen, who helped to shape my thinking on
this subject through much stimulating discussion. It is an honor to dedicate the final result
to his memory.
^ In recent years three valuable studies on this subject have ap(>eared: E. Trepanier, "La
politique comme philosophic morale chez Aristote," Dialogue 2 (1963) 251-79; S.
CashdoUar, "Aristotle's Politics of Morals," JHP 11 (1973) 146-60; R. Bodeus. Le
philosophe et la cite: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensee
d' Aristote (Paris 1982); see also P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Political Intention of
Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985) 77-89.
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Study of this problem has been plagued by confusion since antiquity.
Traditional assumptions notwithstanding, abundant evidence demonstrates
that Aristotle's ethical writings do not constitute an "autonomous moral
science,"2 but rather form part of his comprehensive political science.^
Despite the unfortunate title of one recent article, Aristotle never "calls
ethics ethics.'"* He never employs the terms "ethics" (*e'thike) or "ethical
science" (*ethike episteme).^ Whenever he refers to the subject-matter of his
ethical writings, he always designates it as politike. Thus in the Rhetoric,
when discussing "the investigation concerned with matters of character,
which it is just to call political" (1356a26-27; cf. 1359b9-ll), he outhnes
the whole complex of topics treated in the ethical writings under this
heading.^ Numerous passages of the EN, moreover, clearly identify his
^This is the view of R. A. Gauthier and J. Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain 1959)
n.l 1-2, 10-12; see contra Cashdollar (previous note) 157-58 and Bodeiis (previous note)
81, who rightly insist that one cannot infer an "autonomous moral science" from
Aristotle's use of the term e'lhikoi logoi (see below, note 13). This confusion may be
traced back to the early Peripatos. The author of the MM, an early Peripatetic of
Theophrastus' generation who frequently defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine
the philosophical motivation of which no longer is understood (cf. W. Jaeger, "Uber
Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals," SBBerlin [1928] 402-12; P.
A. Vander Waerdt, "The Peripatetic Inteipretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," GRBS
26 [1985] 283-302), undertakes to speak "concerning ethics" (\)7iep t)Gik(ov [1181a25-
81bl]), but insists repeatedly that his enquiry is part of politike (cf. 1182bl-6, 27-32;
1183a3-5, 21-24, 33-35; 1197b28-29), evidently to save Aristotle's official des-
ignation of his enquiry. Aristotle's presentation oi politike in separate treatises seems to
have led even early Peripatetics to isolate his enquiry into character from politike' as a
whole.
^ Cashdollar (above, note 1) 148-49 argues that Aristotle "never speaks of a
subdivision or branch of politics which treats moral matters apart from matters of sute,"
but his division of the science of the human good into politike', oikonomike and phrone'sis
(EE 1218bl2-16) suggests that Aristotle considered enquiry into the individual, household
and city each to be subdivisions of politike' as a whole, a view confinmed by his plan of
exposition (cf. Vander Waerdt [above, note 1] 82-84). In the further discussion here
promised (1218bl5-16), he distinguishes between phronesis as (a) concerned with the
individual; (b) concerned with the household; (c) the architectonic part concerned with
legislation, phronesis nomothetike; and (d) the "political" part, subdivided into
deliberative and judicial components (1141b23-42all). Thus one subdivision of po-
litike is concerned with "moral matters."
^C. Chamberlain. "Why Aristode CaUed Ethics Ethics," Hermes 112 (1984) 176-83,
who argues that Aristotle invented ta e'thika to designate "the new field of ethics" (he
follows Gauthier and Jolif uncritically).
^ As J. Burnet pointed out long ago. The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1900) 25-27. The
curious scholarly fashion of rejecting Aristotle's stated position is well exemplified by M.
Riedel's claim that Aristotle's designation of his enquiry as politike' "indicates conceptual
confusion" ("Concerning Several Aporiai in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy," Ancient
Philosophy 1 [1981] 156-57 with 159 n. 28; similarly, e.g., H. H. Joachim, Aristotle.
The Nicomachean Ethics [Oxford 1951] 16).
^ In treating the subjects of deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory (1358b4-
59a5), Aristotle resumes all the basic topics treated in the ethical and political writings,
explicitly stating that these topics properly belong to politike rather than rhetoric; cf.
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subject-matter as p<?//rf^", as do parallels in the EE? Such evidence shows
plainly that this subject-matter belongs to political science, not to an
independent science of ethics. More importantly, as I shall argue,
Aristotle's doctrine in the EN can only be properly understood in light of
the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.
If we are to understand Aristotle's intention in offering a teaching on
politike, we must first clarify the place of the ethical writings within its
plan. Failure to reconstruct this plan precisely, I suggest, has obscured the
interpretation of Aristotle's moral philosophy in fundamental ways.
I
Let us begin, for purposes of orientation, by surveying Aristotle's
programmatic statements concerning his plan and intention in the EN. We
will then consider the genuine difficulties which have hindered understanding
of this plan in the past, and outline our proposed solution.
In the opening pages of the EN, Aristotle designates the subject-matter
of his inquiry as politike, the architectonic science of the human good
(1094a26-bl5), specifies the proper audience oi politike (1095a2-13), and
discusses its methodology (1095a30-bl3). The aim oi politike is to educate
citizens in accordance with the human good, a final end which is chosen for
its own sake (1094al8-22), as Aristotle explains (1094a28-bll):
Politike determines which of the sciences are to exist in the cities,
which sciences each [of the citizens] is to learn, and to what extent.
And we see that even the most honored of the capacities are subordinate
to it—military strategy, household management and rhetoric, for
example. Since politike uses the rest of the sciences and since,
furthermore, it legislates what [the citizens] are to do and what they are
not to do, its end would seem to encompass the ends of the other
sciences and capacities, so that the end of politike would be the human
good. For even if this is the same for the individual and for the city,
the good of the city would appear to be the greater and more perfect
thing to attain and preserve, for the attairunent of the good by one man
below, note 19, and Poetics 1450b4-12 with G. Else, Aristotle's Poetics (Cambridge, MA
1957) 265-70.
^ Aristotle's audience in the EE consists of statesmen (1216b35-39), and he attempts
(at 1216b26-17al8) to identify the mode of enquiry necessary to achieve the conjunction
between the individual's good and the good without qualification which it is the purpose of
politike to produce (cf. 1236b39-37a3. 1248b26-37; Pol. 1331b24-32bl0). (For other
hints that the EE is conceived as a political inquiry: 1216al0-37 with 1153b7-25,
1214a30-b5, 1215bl-5; 1216bl8-25 with EN 1112bll-14; 1218a33-35; 1218bll-16
with 1141b21-42all; 1234b22-23; and. in the common books. 1130b25-29 with
1276bl6-77b32; 1137bl7-24; 1152bl-5.) At 1216b37 I accept the emendation x©
noXixiKcp for the z5>v noXixiKoiv of the MSS (M. Woods in his edition of the EE [Oxford
1982] 201 ascribes this emendation to Ross/Walzer. but it may be found in H. Richards'
Aristotelica [London 1915] 53).
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alone is desirable, but it is even nobler and more divine for f>eoples and
cities. Our inquiry, then, aims for these things, being a political one.
Thus politike aims to direct the other practical sciences in achieving
ends, both for individuals and cities, which properly conform to the human
good. Its aim, in short, is not knowledge but action (1095a5-6).* And this
is why Aristotle's audience consists of statesmen (actual or potential),'
whose training in politike is intended to enable them to produce citizens
who are good, obedient to the laws and practitioners of noble deeds (cf.
1099b28-32, 1102a7-10, 1103b3-^, 1140b7-ll, 1177bl2-15).io
Accordingly, Aristotle aims throughout the EN to provide this audience
with the knowledge of the human good necessary to legislate well. Thus,
for example, he explains that inquiry into pleasure and pain is of particular
importance for the political philosopher (cf. 1095alO-12, 1152al-3), just
as study of the voluntary and involuntary is useful for the lawgiver in
allocating honors and punishments (1109b30-35; cf. 1180a5-14). Above
all, when introducing his programmatic division of the soul in 1. 13,
Aristotle explains that the true statesman must study the human soul in
order to attain a knowledge of eudaimonia sufficient to legislate well
(1102a7-25). His psychology in the EN accordingly is not intended, like
that of the De Anima, to account for all the soul's functions, but only for
those directly relevant to human conduct; ^^ thus it is fundamentally
^Ci.EN 1099b28-32. 1102a7-12. 1103b3-6. 1140b7-ll. 1177bl2-15, 1179a35-
b2; EE 1236b39-37a3. Of course Aristotle does introduce "theoretical philosophy"
wherever appropriate {EE 12 14a 15)—an important example of which is his introduction of
"disembodied nous" from the De Anima in EN 10 (see below, note 12). But his use of it is
subservient to his practical intention: While theoretical knowledge is an end in itself, it
may be useful "accidentally" (1216b3-17al8), and the statesman must acquire such
knowledge to attain the ends of /Jo//r«A:e- (1216b35-39. 1236b39-37a3; cf. 1215b2-4,
1216a25-26).
' For the evidence, see Bodeiis (above, note 1) 123-25. Since legislative science is
useful (and necessary in inferior regimes) for individuals who seek to turn others toward
virtue, Aristotle's enquiry benefits not just statesmen. Still, Aristotle can achieve his
practical aim only by educating political men, who alone are able to bring about the
conjunction between the citizens' good and the good without qualification which politike
aims to produce.
^° Aristotle holds that the city exists by nature to foster eudaimonia among its citizens
(cf. 1252b29-30, 1278b21-24, 1281al-4, 1325a5-10, 1328a35-41), a purpose of
course realized only in the case of the best regime, whose educational program accords with
the human good (cf. EE 1236b38-37a3, 1248b26-37; Pol. 1293bl-7, 1328b34-29a2.
1331b24-32a38); see C. Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle
(Ithaca 1982); P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best
Reeime," Phronesis 30 (1985) 249-73.
This contrast between Aristotle's moral and theoretical psychology emerges clearly
from his criticism of the familiar divisions of moral psychology at De Anima 432a24-b7;
see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division," AJP 108 (1987) 627-
43.
Paul A. Vander Waerdt 235
informed by the political intention animating his enquiry as a whole. ^^
Finally, as Aristotle explains in detail in EN 10. 9, his teaching on
politike remains incomplete without an account of legislation and the forms
of regime.
Let us turn, then, to restore Aristotle's moral philosophy to this
political framework. We must first clarify three genuine difficulties which
have impeded this task in the past: (i) the relation of the two ethical
writings to the Politics; (ii) the latter's plan of argument; and (iii)
Aristotle's intention in dividing his account of politike into separate
treatises.
(i) Although the EE is not, like the EN, elaborately linked to a political
work, all citations of the ethikoi logoi in the extant Politics refer to the EE
or to the common books {EN 5-7 = EE 4-6), which—as is generally
agreed—were originally written for the EEP the earlier of the two treatises.
Thus the composition of the extant Politics postdates the EE and antedates
the EN}^ Given this chronology, which has been strangely neglected, it is
'^I have argued this thesis in detail in an essay on "The Statesman and the Soul," which
I plan to publish in the near future.
13 Cf. 1261a30, 1280al8, 1282b20. 1295a36. 1332a8. 1332a22 and Mel. 981b25
with W. Jaeger. Aristotle (Oxford 1948) 283-85, F. Dirlmeier. Eudemische Ethik (Berlin
1962) 111-15 and A. Kenny. The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978) 5-8. Kenny argues in
detail for the Eudemian origin of the common books, although much of his case is
seriously flawed (cf. J. M. Cooper. Nous 15 [1981] 381-92). Cooper claims that Aristotle
reworked the common books for inclusion in the EN, but his sole argument in support
—
that 1130b26-29 refers not to the Politics as generally thought but to 1 180b23-81a31
is not cogent. Aristotle does not discuss the individual's education in 10. 9 (1180b7—8)
insofar as he is haplos anir agathos, nor is the relation between the good man and good
citizen—which, as the gar (1130b29) clearly shows, is part of the evidence for the
promised discussion—even mentioned in 10. 9. Therefore 1130b26-29 must refer to the
themauc discussion at Pol. 1276bl6-77b32 (subsequently elaborated at 1278bl-5.
1283b40-84a3. 1288a38-b2. 1293b5-7. 1328b33-29a2, 1333all-16). and Cooper's
claim is left without support.
1* The fact that the Politics cites the EE rather than the EN is strangely neglected by
Kenny (above, note 13) 226-30 in his attempt to prove the priority of the EN to the EE,
but it is incontrovertible proof of the relative chronology here advocated: If the Politics
postdated the EN, after all. it would follow the plan of 1181bl2-24. and it would not cite
the EE. Kenny's claim that EE 1244b29-36 criticizes EN 1170a25-b9 fails: (a) There is
no evidence that Aristotle is criticizing a written text: the phrase ev t« Xoyo) does not
mean "in the book," but merely refers to the aporia raised at the beginning of 7. 12 (cf.
1244b31, which refers to the "argument" of b29-30; 1245a27 and 1245bl2, where logos
refers to the aporia raised at the beginning of 1244b2). (b) The EN does not advance the
position criticized at EE 1244b29-36. since it never asserts that the happy man will have
no friends, which the logos in question maintains, (c) Kenny's claim that to yivcEKJKeiv
avTO {EE 1244b29) is a criticism of the EN for "the exaggerated value placed upon the
abstract awareness of one's own or other's existence" misses Aristotle's point about the
relation between friendship and self-sufficiency: God escapes the need for friendship by
being his own object of cognition, whereas we, in order to know ourselves as good, require
an object for the operation of our cognitive capacities, a need which our friend fulfills.
Kenny's argument thus provides no evidence at all for the chronological relation between
the two ethical writings.
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no surprise that the EN and Politics do not provide a straightforward,
comprehensive exposition of politike.
(ii) There are in fact serious discrepancies between the political work
outlined at EN 1 181bl2-24 and the extant Politics: Not only does the lauer
diverge in detail from the program outlined, but it fails to provide the
account of the laws appropriate to each form of regime which Aristotle says
is necessary to complete his enquiry. Hence the overall plan of politike has
remained quite obscure. Fortunately, however, the numerous unfulfilled
forward references in the Politics, also so^angely ignored, prove conclusively
that Aristotle intended to complete his work with an extensive account (his
"discourses on the regimes" [Pol. 1260b8-20]) of legislation and the forms
of regime. These plans for the completion of the Politics, I shall argue,
correspond exacUy to the work outlined at EN 1 181bl2-24.
(iii) Finally, Aristotle's division of his teaching on politike into
separate treatises has encouraged scholars to abstract the EN from its
political context. For although the EN forms part of politike , it
nevertheless abstracts from the political considerations—such as the forms
of regime, their laws and ways of life—which in practice always inform the
individual's moral education. And the Politics, in its extant incomplete
form, contains no thematic account of how to relate the doctrine of the EN
to the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes, or of the practical
use the statesman is to make of this doctrine when legislating. Hence it has
remained unclear precisely how the EN is incomplete without the Politics.
These difficulties concerning Aristotle's intention can be resolved by
reconstructing precisely his plan of politike. In his "discourses on the
regimes," Aristotle intended to reconsider his accounts of moral virtue,
education and oikonomia (already treated in EN and Pol. 1) from the
perspective of the various forms of regime and their divergent ends. When
Aristotle abstracts from the political conditions of moral education in the
EN, he does so quite intentionally, because he plans to complete this
account by reconsidering it from a political point of view in his "discourses
on the regimes." This is the intention that underlies the structure of
Aristotle's plan oi politike.
My argument is organized as follows. We first (Section II) discuss the
unfulfilled forward references in the Politics, which demonstrate that
Aristotle intended to complete it as promised at EN 1181bl2-24. Next
(Section III), we consider Aristotle's promised "discourses on the regimes,"
their place in the plan oi politike, and the philosophical motivation of this
plan. In Section IV we examine how to reconcile the teaching on moral
education in the EN with the doctrine that education must conform to the
ends promoted by the regime in force, and how the statesman's education in
legislative science enables him to turn the citizens even of inferior regimes
toward the good life properly understood. Finally, we conclude (Section V)
by showing that the moral virtues vary according to the "character" and ends
promoted by the different forms of regime.
Paul A. Vander Waerdt 237
In the concluding chapter of the EN (10. 9), Aristotle turns to explain why
an enquiry into legislation and the forms of regime is necessary to complete
his account oipolitike}^ Discourses alone do not suffice to produce moral
improvement, he says, because some human beings are not amenable to the
j)ersuasion of reason; hence the compulsion of law is necessary (1179b20-
80b25). And since politike has the practical purpose of improving moral
conduct, the EN itself remains fundamentally incomplete without a teaching
on law to effect this improvement. Aristotle's practical intention thus
inevitably subsumes enquiry into human character into what he calls
"legislative science" {phronesis nomothetike), which is the "architectonic"
component in Aristotle's division of politike}^ Accordingly, legislative
science takes on an extraordinary scope. First, legislative science regulates
the education not merely of the young, but rather of all citizens throughout
their lives (1180al-4):
Doubtless it is not sufficient for men to receive the right nurture and
discipline in youth, but they must practise what they have learned and
reinforce their lessons by habit even when they have grown up. For
this purpose we need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well,
and indeed the whole of life.
This continuing education in virtue for mature citizens accords well, of
course, with the educational program of Aristotle's best regime in Pol. 1-
%}'^ Second, anyone who wishes to improve the moral conduct of others
must acquire legislative science; one who does so will become like Pencles,
skilled in managing his own affairs as well as those of the household and
city.^^ The scope of legislative science is due in part to the neglect with
which cities (Sparta excepted) treat their citizens' moral education. In the
absence of an adequate program of public education, Aristotle says,
legislative science enables an individual to turn his children and friends to
virtue (1180a24-34). As the architectonic component oi politike, it directs
the moral education both of whole cities and of individual citizens in inferior
'' See the analysis of Bodeiis (above, note 1) 95-132.
**Cf. Bodeus (above, note 1) 113-14. Since Aristotle holds ihdX politike And phronesis
are the same hexis, the architectonic component of phronesis is identical with the archi-
tectonic component of politike.
^^
Cf. Lord (above, note 10) 34-35, 100-04, 177-79.
^* Cf. 1142a7-10 (where I accept Richards' noXiTiKfiq for the MSS' noXixtiac,).
Aristotle's conclusion here that one cannot attain phronesis in one's own affairs without
oikonomia and politike proves that the individual, in order to manage his own affairs well,
must acquire legislative science. Cf. 1180b23-26: "Presumably, then, one who wishes to
make others (whether many or few) better through discipline must endeavour to acquire
legislative science—if indeed we may become better through laws."
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regimes who seek to educate their families and friends in accordance with the
human good.
Before turning to outline the enquiry necessary to complete the
statesman's education in legislative science, Aristotle considers competing
claims to teach this science, which is, he says, a "part" of politike
(1180530-31). In this case its practitioners, the statesmen, do not
themselves teach it, apparently relying upon experience {empeiria) rather
than thought (dianoia). And the sophists who claim to teach it fail,
principally for two reasons: First, they fundamentally misconceive the
proper relation between rhetoric and politike, wrongly considering the latter
identical with or even inferior to the former (1181al2-19);^' and second,
"they think that it is easy to legislate by collecting the best-reputed of the
laws ... as though the selection did not require understanding (synesis)."'^^
For Aristotle, on the other hand, rhetoric is a subordinate component of
politike which the statesman employs to achieve the ends fixed upon by his
legislative science.^^
" Aristotle opposes the sophistic assimilation of politike to rhetoric in order to
restore politike to its proper status as the architectonic science which governs all the other
practical capacities. In fact, he apparently objects to the study of rhetoric in controversy
with Isocrates over its proper relation to politike, defending the study of "political
rhetoric" on grounds similar to those advanced in the concluding section of EN 10. 9 (cf.
Cic. De Oratore 3. 141; Philodemus, Rhet. 6 with H. M. Hubbell, "Isocrates and the
Epicureans." CP 11 [1916] 405-18, "The Rhetorica of Philodemus," Trans. Conn.
Academy of Arts and Sciences 23 [1920] 243-382; I. During, Aristotle in the Ancient
Biographical Tradition [Goteborg 1957] 299-311). For the precise sense in which he
considers rhetoric subordinate to politike see especially his discussion of deliberative
oratory in Rhetoric 1. 4 (1359b2-16). In the earlier passage to which Aristotle here
aUudes, he says that, because rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and politike', it
"slips into the garb of politike;" those sophists who claim to possess it do so partly
through lack of education, partly through boastfulness, and partly through other all-too-
human causes (1356a25-30). Their chief mistake is that they fail to recognize the
difference between "common" topics, which furnish syllogisms and enthymemes for all
sciences, whatever their difference in species, and "specific" topics, which are derived from
propositions peculiar to each species or genus and which correspondingly furnish
syllogisms and enthymemes applicable only to a particular science (1358al0-33; cf.
1356a30-33). The sophists' failure to understand this difference leads them to transgress
the limits of rhetoric (1358a2-9) and to lose sight of the fact that only politike can supply
the "specific" topics necessary for deliberation about political matters. By clarifying the
nature and limited scope of rhetoric Aristotle shows why it must be subordinate to
politike, the architectonic science which provides these "specific" topics.
^° Aristotle holds that the sophists' assumption that it is easy to legislate by
collecting the best-reputed of the laws merely reveals ignorance of the understanding
(synesis) necessary to judge which laws are suitable in which circumstances (1181al5-
bl2). The sophists fail to recognize that the regime is the guiding source of law, and that
different regimes and ways of life are appropriate to different peoples, depending upon
their natural character—^laws which are appropriate to one form of regime can endanger
another's very preservation.
^' Cf. C. Lord. "The Intention of AristoUe's Rhetoric," Hermes 109 (1981) 326-39;
and, on Aristotle's critique of Hippodamus, L. Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago 1964)
17-25.
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The fundamental deficiencies in the sophists' understanding of the
proper task of legislation require Aristotle to consider how the study of
regimes may advance the statesman's education. The concluding paragraph
of the EN requires close attention as his most precise statement of his plan
(1181bl2-24):
Since our predecessors have left the question concerning legislation
unexamined, j>erhaps it is best if we ourselves investigate it, and indeed
the question concerning regimes generally, in order to complete the
philosophy concerning human affairs. First, then, let us try to review
any discussion of merit contributed by our predecessors on any
particular part of the subject; then, on the basis of our collection of
regimes, to investigate what kinds of institutions save and destroy
cities in general, and each of the forms of regime in particular, and
through what causes some are well governed and others the reverse. For
after we have investigated these things perhaps we will understand
better what is the best regime, and how each of the regimes is ordered
and what laws and customs each uses. Let us then begin the discussion.
The discrepancies between this outline and the extant Politics frequently
have led scholars to declare 1181bl2-24 spurious.^^ 7^^ ^q^[ serious of
their objections is easily removed,^^ and their conclusion is quite
^^ For a review of the objections brought against this passage and an able defence of its
authenticity, see Bodeiis (above, note 1) 147-52. C. Lord's attempt ("The Character and
Composition of Aristotle's Politics" Political Theory 9 [1981] 472-74) to attribute this
passage to Theophrastus as the outline of his Politics in six books (D.L. 5. 45) is not
cogent.
Aristotle's statement that legislation has been left uninvestigated by his
predecessors (1181bl2-15) has been widely misunderstood by commentators, who do not
see how Aristotle could have written this in view of Plato's works (thus e.g. F. Susemihl
and R. D. Hicks speak of their posited interpolator's "madness," The Politics of Aristotle
[London 1894] 69). To explain this criticism one need only consider his statement that
"The Laws is concerned for the most part with laws, and little is said about the regime"
(1265al-2). Aristotle holds that the regime is the taxis of offices which detemiines what
is sovereign in the city and what is its end, the source of the laws laid down to promote the
city's way of life (cf. L. Strauss, Natural Right and History [Chicago 1953] 135-38 and R.
Bodeiis, "Les legislations malheureuses: Remarques sur la constitutionnalite des lois
d'apres Aristote" [forthcoming]). Plato's Laws, however, is not an account of the regime
in this technical sense (cf. G. R. Morrow, "Aristotle's Comments on Plato's Laws," in
Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. 1. During and G. Owen [Goteborg 1960]
147-48). Moreover, since Aristotle correctly recognizes that the "second-best" regime of
the Laws by virtue of its abandonment of radical communism is only a more practical
version of the best regime of the Republic, as the Athenian Stranger himself suggests (cf.
1265al-9 and 1265b31-66a6 with Laws 739a-e, 711a-12a, 875c-d), and therefore that it
presupposes the same educational program and the rule of the same philosophy (cf. H.
Chemiss. Gnomon 25 [1953] 377-79 and T. L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato [New York
1980] 376-77, 459-62, 504, 509-10). he can legitimately deny that Plato as well as his
other predecessors (cf. 1288b39-89alO. 1316b25-27) had investigated legislation.
Since the laws are laid down to suit the regime and not vice versa, an account of legislation
presupposes enquiry into the forms of regime, and Plato had concerned himself only with
the best regime and not with the "collections of regimes and laws" which would be useful to
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unjustified. This passage, I shall argue, rather indicates Aristotle's plan for
the revision and completion of the Politics?^ Its numerous unfulfilled
forward references show conclusively that Aristotle planned to revise it as
promised at 1181512-24. We may begin by considering how well the
extant Politics conforms to this outline.
This passage does not clearly account for Pol. 1: While its argument
originates in a refutation of Plato's identification of the forms of rule with
one another {Statesman 258e-59c), and hence might be regarded together
with Book 2 as the promised critique of Aristotle's predecessors (bl5-17),
an account of oikonomia does not obviously fall under the heading of
nomothesia, the neglect of which by Aristotle's predecessors requires him to
undertake the enquiry promised at 1181bl2-24. Thus the work here
outlined might well have begun with Book 2, if this is the critique of his
predecessors that Aristotle has in mind here.^^ The following lines (bl7-
20) do not obviously account for Books 3 and 4; but in promising to
explain, on the basis of his collection of regimes, what preserves and
destroys them, Aristotle clearly refers to Books 5 and 6 (cf. 1289b23-26,
1301al9-25, 1316b31-36). He then mentions the best regime of Books 7-
8 (b20-21), but the further investigation of how each regime is ordered and
what laws and customs it uses (b22) does not occur in the extant Politics.
This fact is of the greatest importance. The emphasis throughout EN 10. 9
on the study of legislation does not square well with our Politics, which
investigates the regimes and does not provide the account of legislation
which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his enquiry,^
train the statesman in legislative science. Aristotle criticizes Plato because his exclusive
interest in the best regime leads him to ignore the fonms of regime with which the
statesman ordinarily must concern himself, and therefore makes his work insufficient to
serve as the basis for the education of Aristotle's statesman (set out in Pol. 4. 1).
^ Bodeiis' most recent discussion of this passage, "La recherche politique d'apres le
programme de L'Elhique a Nicomaque d'Aristote," LEC 51 (1983) 23-33, offers several
stimulating suggestions; but his central claim, that "le philosophe . . . pourrait avoir
vouler seulement mettre son auditoire en mesure de voir et comprendre, sans envisager
expUquer lui-meme ce qui devait etre vu et compris," is contradicted not only by the plain
syntax of the passage (note the subjunctive verbs), but also by the numerous unfulfiUed
forward references in the Politics, collected herein, which prove that he planned to revise
and complete it as outlined at 1181bl2-24.
^ Cf. 1260b20-24, where Aristotle undertakes a new beginning by considering his
predecessors' views on the best regime. Whatever Aristotle's reasons for beginning the
Politics with a critique of Plato on the forms of rule and oikonomia, the argument of Book
2 does not obviously depend upon Book 1 , and so a revised version might have begun with
Book 2. If Aristotle did plan to begin with a critique of his predecessors' views on the
regime, he certainly would have focused upon the best regime, since his predecessors had
left legislation uninvestigated by their exclusive focus on the best regime (cf. above, note
23).
^In fact the whole argument of the Politics from the end of Book 1 (1260b22-24) is
devoted to the study of regimes, as may be seen by considering the programmatic remarks
at the beginning of each of Books 2-8.
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Fortunately, however, abundant evidence shows that Aristotle planned
to provide this promised (1181522) account in his "discourses on the
regimes." There are several forward references, unfulfilled in our Politics,
which demonstrate that this work was to include an account of legislation,
considered in light of the various forms of regime which lay down the end to
which the laws are directed
—
precisely what Aristotle's account of the
lawgiver's education in EN 10. 9 would lead one to expect. Thus Aristotle
dismisses at the first stage of his argument a discussion of whether it is
expedient for a general to hold office for life on the ground that this is more
the form of enquiry into laws than of that into the regime (1286a2-7). The
implication is that at a later stage, when the enquiry into regimes is
completed, Aristotle will take up that concerning the laws. This inter-
pretation is confirmed by his programmatic remarks in 4. 1, where he says
that the lawgiver, in order to aid existing regimes, must know not only the
various forms of regime but also which laws are suited to which regime; the
laws promote the regime's particular ends, and so the lawgiver must
understand the forms of regime in order to legislate well (1289a5-25).
Hence enquiry into regimes must precede that into legislation (1181bl3-
14). This evidence, together with EN 1181b22 and unfulfilled forward
references in Books 4 (1300b5-9) and 6 (1316b40-17al)—hence Books 4
and 6 cannot be taken as the promised investigation of legislation—show
that Aristotle planned to follow his enquiry into the various regimes, which
culminates in the account of the best regime in Books 7-8, with one into
the laws appropriate to the others as well.^
To reconstruct more precisely how Aristotle planned to revise the
Politics, let us consider the concluding paragraph of Pol. 1, which provides
an invaluable guide to the plan of the work as a whole. Here Aristotle
explains why his account of the forms of rule and of the virtue and education
of members of the household in Book 1 is incomplete and why it must be
reconsidered in his promised "discourses on the regimes" (1260b8-20):
^^ Note also Aristotle's unfulfilled promise at 1135al3-15 to consider the various
forms of justice and injustice, which he may have planned to do in the "discourses on the
regimes" in light of the various forms of regime (at 1130b26-29 there is an unambiguous
forward reference to the Politics [cf. above, note 13)). Note also his account of the five
subjects of deliberative oratory in Rhet. 1. 4, which he prefaces (1359bl6-18) and
concludes (1360a37) by saying that these subjects belong properly to politike' rather than
rhetoric. The five subjects are ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country,
imports and exports, and legislation (cf. Xen. Mem. 3. 6)—the last being of particular
importance, since the city's safety lies in its hands. Consequently, Aristotle says, the
deliberative orator must know how many forms of regime there are, what is expedient for
each, and how each is destroyed (1360a2{)-23). And, in order to legislate well, he needs to
learn from other peoples "what forms of regime are suiuble to what kinds of people"
(1360a33), for which purpose he recommends travel books for instruction about the laws
of other races. This summary of the subject-matter of politike underlines the crucial role of
legislation in Aristotle's thought, and confirms our contention that he planned to consider
the laws and forms of regime appropriate to various peoples. See also Rhet. 1365b21-
66a 16.
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Concerning the virtue belonging severally to the man, woman,
children and father and their intercourse towards one another—what is
the noble and the ignoble course of action, and how it is necessary to
pursue the good and flee the evil—it is necessary to go through in the
discourses on the regimes. For since every household is part of a city,
and since the members are parts of the household, and one must see the
virtue of the part with reference to the virtue of the whole, it is
necessary for both children and women to be educated with a view to the
regime, if it makes any difference for the goodness of the city whether
the children and women are good. And it must make a difference: For
the women comprise half of the free population, and from children
come the partners in the regime.
Aristotle's promise here to reconsider oikonomia from the perspective of the
various forms of regime corroborates his plan (1 181b22-24) to complete his
enquiry by considering how each of the regimes is ordered and what laws and
customs each employs. Moreover, this passage also clarifies the contents of
the "discourses on the regimes," whose purpose was to discuss the
legislation and educational programs appropriate to each of the forms of
regime. The many unfulfilled forward references in the Politics, to which
we now turn, show that this account also was to contain a reconsideration of
the contents of Book 1 generally, including natural slavery and acquisition.
(i) In discussing the natural character of the slaves of his best regime,
Aristotle states that if possible they should not be of the same stock, and
not thymoeidetic (1330a25-33; cf. 1264a34-36; [Ps.-Ar.] Oec. 1344bl2-
14), so that they will be useful for work and unlikely to engage in sedition;
or, in the second instance, they should be barbarian subjects who are not
thymoeidetic (cf. 1285al9-22).2* He then concludes, "how slaves should be
employed, and why it is advantageous to set freedom {eleutheria) before
them as a reward, we shall explain later" (1330a31-33; cf. [Ps.-Ar.] Oec.
1344a23-b22; Xen. Oec. 5. 16; Cic. De Off. 1.41). Aristotle probably
considered it necessary to reconsider slave-management because he thought
that each regime will use slaves differently in accordance with the different
ends each promotes (cf. 1322b30-a5).
(ii) The territory of his best regime, Aristotle says (1326b30-39),
should be of such a size as to enable the inhabitants to live liberally
(eleutherids) and moderately; but he promises to reconsider this definition
more precisely later, when speaking generally about acquisition and the
proper use and ownership of wealth. Since Aristotle akeady has discussed
acquisition as a part of oikonomia in 1. 8-11, he apparently plans to
reconsider it in light of the various forms of regime, because the role of
acquisition in a regime varies according to its end (cf. 1280a22-81a8). This
^ Note the reference to the ethnology of 7. 7 at 1285al9-22. Aristotle's insistence
that the best regime's slaves not be of a thymoeidetic character is of considerable
importance for the interpretation of his account of natural slavery in Pol. 1; see "The
Sutesman and the Soul" (above, note 12) Section TV.
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promised account apparently was to form part of Aristotle's reconsideration
of oikonomia in light of the various forms of regime.^'
(iii) Aristotle also planned to discuss education in detail in the
"discourses on the regimes"—not surprisingly, given its central role in his
political thought. At the conclusion of Pol. 1, Aristotle defers discussion
of the education of women and children on the grounds that they must be
educated with reference to the particular regime in force, since different forms
of regime promote different ends, which ends in turn determine its laws and
educational program.^^ At 1337al4-18, Aristotle states that a city's
educational program must correspond to its form of regime, for each regime
has its own ethos, which safeguards its particular way of life. Thus
Aristotle's account of the laws appropriate to the various forms of regime
(1181522-24) must include discussion of their corresponding educational
programs.
Five passages show that he planned to do so. At 1335b2-5, Aristotle
promises to discuss the bodily constitution in parents which is most
beneficial to children in his discourse on the education of children (peri
paidonomias), presumably referring to the account promised at 1260b8-20.
At 1336b24-27, he promises to consider whether the young should be
prevented from seeing iambic verses and comedy; and at 1338a32-36, he
promises to consider whether there is one educational program or several in
which boys (of the best regime) should be trained with a view to the noble
rather than to the necessary. Apparently Aristotle planned to correlate
various educational programs with different regimes. Finally, at 1339bl(>-
1 1 Aristotle promises to consider a series of questions concerning whether
music education is able to improve character, and at 1341b38-40 to discuss
the meaning of katharsis?^ The wide variety in subject no less than the
specificity of these unfulfilled forward references point to an extensive
account of the various programs of public education.
(iv) Aristotle's best regime offers its mature citizens a continuing
education in virtue,^^ ^^d his promise at 1330a3-5 to explain why common
meals are beneficial suggests that he intended to consider the institutional
arrangements best suited to educate mature citizens.
One or two of the foregoing examples might conceivably be taken to
refer to discussions in other works. But taken cumulatively, they clearly
confirm Aristotle's promises to consider how each of the regimes is ordered
and what laws and customs each uses, and to complete the Politics in his
"discourses on the regimes" by reconsidering his initial accounts of virtue
and education in light of the various forms of regime. For our purpose it
^' See further above, note 12.
'°Cf. above, note 16 and below, notes 41-42.
'* For recent accounts, see Lord (above, note 10) 105-50 and R. Janko, Aristotle on
Comedy (London 1984) 136-51.
^^ Cf. above, note 17 and the corresponding text.
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does not matter whether these "discourses" have been lost through a
mechanical accident, or whether they were planned but never written,^^ for
the extant Politics both in its doctrine and plan of argument unambiguously
assumes it. Accordingly, let us consider the place of tlie "discourses on the
regimes" in the plan and intention oipolitike.
m
The persistent scholarly failure to take seriously Aristotle's programmatic
statements concerning the political intention of his enquiry into politike is
due in part simply to failure to reconstruct its plan precisely. Now that we
have seen that Aristotle planned to complete the Politics with the account of
legislation promised at the conclusion of the EN, we may turn to consider
what philosophical considerations led Aristotle to present his teaching on
politike in separate treatises—in his apolitical ethikoi logoi, on the one
hand, and his account of the various forms of regime and their corresponding
laws and educational programs, on the other. We shall focus on how the
"discourses on the regimes" bring his enquiry to completion.^^
The central difficulty which structures Aristotle's presentation of
politike is that of considering the individual's moral education in light of
the wide variety of regimes in which such education takes place. Aristotle
holds that any regime must provide its citizens with a universal, public
education conforming to its particular ends and way of life to ensure its self-
preservation; cities which fail to do so are thereby harmed.^^ The
statesman's first task, accordingly, is to educate his citizens according to the
ends promoted by the regime in force, whether it be democratic, aristocratic
or some other, not to make them good human beings without regard to their
regime's way of life (cf. 1276b30-33). Since only the best regime
promotes ends which accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods,
most human beings receive an education intended to make them good
citizens of their particular regime, not good human beings without
qualification. The doctrine that human beings are to be educated in
accordance with the regime in force thus drives a wedge, except in the
exceptional case of the best regime, between an education intended to
^^ Lx>rd (above, note 22) 470-71 proposes the hypothesis of a mechanical accident to
explain the compositional anomalies of the Politics, but this accident must have taken
place very early in the transmission of the text, if at all, for the Politics alone among the
major works is assigned the correct number of books in the pre-Andronican lists, and the
contrast Cicero draws (Fin. 5. 11) between Aristotle and Theophrastus is explicable only if
the Politics in his day did not include the "discourses on the regimes." Since the numerous
compositional anomalies of the Politics cannot be fully resolved by any rearrangement of
the text, I doubt that it ever was a finished work.
^ Further arguments in support of the interpretation here advanced are presented in the
essay mentioned above, note 12.
35 Cf. 1282bl0-ll, 1289al-25. 1308b20-24. 1310al2-36. 1337all-32.
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produce good citizens
—
good relative to their regime's end—^and one intended
to produce human beings who are also good without qualification.
Now politike aims, of course, to effect a conjunction between the
citizens' good and the good without qualification (cf. above, note 10).
Aristotle's explanation of how the statesman may make men good human
beings in inferior regimes is explored in Section IV. At present, we need to
consider how this problem shapes Aristotle's plan oi politike as set out in
Section II.
There are, of course, other plans of exposition that he might plausibly
have adopted. Thus Aristotle could have treated the forms of regime and
their corresponding educational programs before the moral education of
individuals. Such is his order of exposition, after all, in the Rhetoric:
When considering deliberative oratory he enumerates the five most
important subjects for political deliberation (1.4) before he takes up the
individual's eudaimonia in 1. 5; and, again, in 1. 8-9 he considers the forms
of regime before turning to virtue and vice. In both cases the dependence of
virtue upon the forms of regime leads him to consider the political
phenomena with which oratory is concerned before considering moral
phenomena. Why then did Aristotle not adopt a similar plan in his
exposition of politike, which would enable him to treat moral education in
light of the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes?
Aristotle adopts the plan he does adopt, I suggest, because of his
normative intention: Just as the city exists by nature to foster not mere life
but rather the good life, so Aristotle's enquiry into politike is intended to
enable human beings to lead the good life properly understood.
Consequently, the statesman in legislating is guided by a double teleology
whereby his minimal aim is to preserve his regime, but his higher aim is to
turn it toward the good life, so far as circumstances permit (see below, pp.
249-50). He does not merely legislate in the interest of the regime in force,
but rather fosters eudaimonia for his citizens as far as possible through
political virtue.
Now a moment's reflection shows why this intention precludes the
alternative plan of exposition just suggested. That plan would enable
Aristotle to treat the individual's moral education in light of the different
ends promoted by the various regimes. But, since his purpose is to provide
the statesman with the knowledge necessary to turn any regime toward the
good life, Aristotle could hardly have treated these regimes without first
treating the best regime, dedicated to the promotion of human virtue and
eudaimonia properly understood, from which all other regimes in some
sense are deviations. Yet Aristotle's account of the best regime relies upon
his account of the best way of life for the individual, as he makes plain at
the beginning of Pol. 7 (cf. 1323al4-21, 1324a5-13).36 AristoUe's
normative intention thus requires him to adopt the plan he does adopt: first,
^*Cf. Lord's commenury on 7. 1-3 (above, note 10) 180-89.
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to inquire into the individual's virtue and eudaimonia, abstracting from all
political considerations; then to consider the forms of regime, their laws and
educational programs; and finally, in his "discourses on the regimes," to
reconsider the individual's moral education in light of the divergent ends
each form of regime promotes. In adopting this plan, Aristotle is able to tie
his teaching on moral education to the diversity of regimes in which
education takes place.
This plan obviously gives a crucial place to the "discourses on the
regimes," which relate the individual's eudaimonia to the divergent ends
promoted by the various regimes. In order to aid regimes of all kinds,
"divergent" as well as "correct" ones, the statesman must know how to
apply the doctrine of the ethical writings, always seeking to preserve the
regime even as he turns it toward the good life. In relating moral education
to the forms of regime, the "discourses" enable the statesman to apply his
knowledge of the human good in all circumstances.
Moreover, Aristotle's plan of exposition entails that his teaching in the
EN is fundamentally incomplete, in that it abstracts from the political
circumstances which regulate the individual's moral education. Since all
regimes but the best promote views of justice which are partial or even in
conflict with the human good, and since education always takes place within
a particular political context, the statesman requires a knowledge of
"legislative science" to make this teaching effective in inferior regimes.
This point deserves particular emphasis, because scholars of Aristotle's
moral philosophy, nearly without exception, have ignored the political
intention of his teaching.
To see how the doctrine of the EN and of Pol. 1 is incomplete, and how
the "discourses on the regimes" complete it, let us consider the example of
oikonomia. As we saw, the "discourses" were to reconsider the topics
treated in Pol. 1: the virtue and education of subordinate members of the
household, the fonns of rule (1260b 10- 13), natural slavery (1330a25-33)
and acquisition (1326b33-34). Each topic is incomplete without Aristotle's
promised reconsideration. His initial account of these topics is incomplete
because of the natural differences in the citizen bodies of the various
regimes.^'' In the ethnology of Pol. 7. 7, where Aristotle considers the
natural characters of the Europeans, Asians and Greeks, he explains that
different peoples (including different Greek peoples) have different natural
characters, which make them suited to different kinds of regimes; the
diversity in regimes therefore corresponds to natural differences among
human beings (1327b23-38):
The nations in cold places, and particularly those in Europe, are filled
with spiritedness (thymos), but are relatively lacking in intelligence
{dianoia) and art {techne); hence they remain freer, but lack political
institutions and are unable to rule their neighbours. Those in Asia, on
^' See Section V of the essay oiled above, note 12.
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the other hand, have souls endowed with intelligence and art, but
lacking in thymos; hence they remain ruled and enslaved. But the race
of Greeks shares in both qualities, just as it occupies the middle
position in space. For it is endowed with both intelligence and
thymos; hence it remains free, possesses the best political
institutions, and is capable of ruling over all, if it should obtain a
single regime (politeia). And the nations of the Greeks display the
same differences in their relations with one another; for some have a
nature that is one-sided, whereas others have a nature that is well-
blended in relation to both of these capacities. It is clear, therefore,
that those who are to be readily guided by the lawgiver toward virtue
must be endowed with both intelligence and thymos in their nature.
Aristotle's purpose here is to define the natural qualities of the best regime's
citizens, whose way of life is dedicated to the leisured cultivation of
philosophy (cf. above, note 10). These qualities consist in a natural
endowment of thymos and dianoia, which together make the citizens natural
freemen capable of being educated in virtue (cf. 1332b8-10, 1334b7-8), and
of maintaining their political freedom. Peoples which lack these natural
qualities, Aristotle holds, cannot share in the best way of life.
These natural differences among peoples considerably complicate
Aristotle's exposition of politike. For it entails that the diversity among
regimes has a natural rather than merely conventional basis. Since peoples
differ in their natural characters, different forms of regime and educational
programs are needed to promote the different ways of life of which each is
capable. The various "correct" forms of regime thus correspond to natural
differences among peoples, differences which the statesman must take into
account when seeking to make the citizens' good identical with the good
without qualification.
It is in consideration of the natural differences among various peoples, I
submit, that Aristotle adopts the plan oi politike that we have reconstructed.
In his initial accounts of the moral virtue and education of the individual and
of members of the household, Aristotle plainly wishes to avoid the
complexities that would arise from considering them in terms of the
divergent ends promoted by various regimes. Accordingly, he abstracts from
all relevant political considerations in the EN and Pol. 1. Similarly, as I
have argued in detail elsewhere,^* Aristotle bases the doctrine of Pol. 1 on
the moral psychology of the ethical writings, abstracting from thymos,
whose central role in his psychology does not emerge until Pol. 1. 7. Thus
in his initial account of the eide arches, for example, he treats the natural
relations of rule and subordination in the household on the assumption (later
modified by the introduction of thymos in Pol. 7. 7) that the capacity for
prudent deliberation alone constitutes the psychological basis of human
freedom. He does so because he holds that not all peoples—or all Greek
^* See Section FV of the essay cited above, note 12.
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peoples
—
possess thymos, and that its conjunction with dianoia is even
rarer. Yet, since the individual's moral education is dependent upon the ends
promoted by his regime, Aristotle must reconsider his initial account in
light of the natural characters and corresponding forms of regime appropriate
to the various peoples. Aristotle planned to provide this reconsideration in
his "discourses on the regimes," and the absence of this section from the
extant Politics has greatly impeded our understanding of the plan and
intention animating Aristotle's presentation of politike. Still, our re-
construction of the contents and philosophical motivation of the
"discourses" has enabled us to see that the EN must be understood in light
of the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.
IV
Now that we have reconstructed the plan of Aristotle's exposition of
politike, we need to clarify how the statesman uses the teaching of the
ethical writings when legislating in particular regimes. In other words, how
is that teaching related to the requirement that a regime educate its citizens
in accordance with the ends it promotes? As Aristotle explains in Pol. 7.
1-3, the statesman's view of the best way of life for his city depends upon
his view of the best way of life for the individual.^^ But his first task, as
Aristotle also emphasizes, is to legislate in accordance with the ends
promoted by the regime in force.'*^ Hence Aristotle considers how to
preserve not only the "correct" forms of regime, but even tyranny, the worst
of the deviant forms. Since the ends promoted by the forms of regime (apart
from the best regime) often are incompatible not only with one another but
even with the human good,'*' a fundamental dilemma arises. While
politike aims to make the citizens' good identical with the human good, the
statesman in an inferior regime, if he is to secure its preservation, may well
have to legislate with a view to ends which are incompatible with the
human good.
It is Aristotle's account of legislative science (phronesis nomothetike),
I suggest, which resolves the dilemma. This science enables an individual,
in the absence of an adequate program of public education, to turn his
children and friends toward virtue (1180a29-34). Since only Sparta among
actual regimes possesses such an educational program, legislative science
enables individual citizens as well as the statesman to educate others in
accordance with the human good even in inferior regimes which promote
^' Cf. above, note 36 and Vander Waerdl (above, note 1) 84-85.
*° Cf. the passages cited above, note 35.
*^ Although Aristotle designates regimes which aim at the common advantage as
"correct," and regimes which aim at the ruler's advanuge "deviant" (1279al7-21), even
correct regimes diverge from the best way of life because the ends they promote are partial
and do not accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods (see below. Section V).
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ends incompatible with the human good.'*^ In legislating he is guided by a
double teleology whereby his first task is to secure his regime's
preservation,"*^ but his higher task is always to turn it toward the good life
and to foster genuine eudaimonia as far as possible through pohtical virtue.
This double teleology well accords with the role Aristotle assigns to
political life in realizing man's natural capacities. As a "political animal"
man requires a certain kind of political community in order to survive and
live well, and the city comes into being for the sake of life, but it exists for
the sake of the good life.'*'* The statesman's purpose, accordingly, is to
investigate how cities, families and human beings may share in the good
life and eudaimonia.^^ To secure this end he must ensure the city's
preservation, and so may be said to be concerned in the first instance with
"mere life" as opposed to the good life. But his higher purpose is always to
improve his citizens' way of life in accordance with the normative intention
oipolitike.
The most striking example of this double teleology at work is
Aristotle's discussion in 5. 9 of the two ways of preserving tyranny: First,
the tyrant may seek to humble his subjects, keeping them in mutual distrust
and incapable of action—thus preserving his power but in no way falling
short of wickedness (1313a24-14a29); or he may attempt to make his rule
kingly, governing in his citizens' interest and protecting only his power
—
thus his rule will become more honorable and longer lived, and his character
will become nobly disposed toward virtue or at least only half-base
(1314a30-15blO). This second course of action shows how the tyrant's rule
may be turned toward virtue even as it is preserved. This example also
illustrates how legislative science can aid in effecting the mpral
improvement of inferior regimes within the constraints imposed by its ends.
In seeking to reform an existing regime or to found a new one, then,
the statesman aims to turn it toward the good life, so much as circumstances
permit. To discharge this task, as Aristotle explains in 4. 1, he needs to
understand each of the forms of regime, their corresponding laws and
*^ Bodeiis (above, note 1) 113 n. 26 goes seriously astray in his contention that "il
s'agit, en roccurrence, de remedier aux carences du legislateur et non d'edicter des regies de
conduite pretendument meilleures que les nonmes implicitement recommandees par la
legislation," an assumption which vitiates his conclusion (221-25). This interpretation
of the intention of legislative science is unsupported by any text and is refuted by the
evidence adduced below which proves that the statesman's task is not merely to legislate in
the interest of the regime in force, but to foster eudaimonia among his citizens.
^^ On Aristotle's preference for reforming a deviant regime rather than replacing it
through revolution, see R. Bodeiis, "La duree des regimes poUtiques comme condition de la
morale selon Aristote," Justifications de I'ethique, XIXe Congres de 1' Association des
Societes de PhUosophie de Langue Fran9aise (Louvain 1983) 103-08.
'*'*Cf. 1252b29-30 with 1278bl9-30, 1280a31-34, 1280b39-81a4, 1283al4-22;
EN 1160all-30.
^^Cf. 1325a7-10 with 1333a33-39; EN 1099b29-30, 1103b2-6, 1113b21-26,
1129bl4-30al3.
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educational programs, and what tends to preserve and destroy them. In order
to realize his normative intention, in other words, he requires a wide body of
empirical knowledge, partly provided in Books 4-6 and partly promised for
the "discourses on regimes," to guide him in legislating for the various
regimes. The task of poUtike, Aristotle holds, is four-fold (1288521-35):
It is clear that, with respect to the regime, it belongs to the same
science to investigate (i) what the best regime is, and what quality it
should have to be what one would particularly pray for, with external
things providing no impediment; and (ii) which regime is fitting for
which [peoples]. For perhaps it is impossible for many to obtain the
best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman ought not to
overlook the one that is superior simply and the one that is best under
the circumstances. Moreover, thirdly, [it belongs to the same science
to investigate] (iii) the regime based upon a presupposition: for any
given regime ought to be investigated [to determine how] it could arise
in the beginning and in what way, once it has come into existence, it
could be preserved for the longest time (I mean the case where it
happens that some city neither conducts politics in the manner of the
best regime—and lacks even the necessary equipment for it—nor in the
manner of the regime possible for it under the circumstances, but some
inferior one); and, besides all these things, (iv) the regime that is
especially fitting for all cities ought to be recognized . . .
Aristotle's program of politike is intended to avoid his predecessors'
errors of failing to investigate the best possible regime and the one more
attainable for all, or of praising some existing one, such as the Spartan (cf.
1260b27-36). In contrast, Aristotle holds that the statesman should be able
to aid existing regimes by reforming them in accordance with an
airangement that arises directly out of those that exist (1289al-5; cf. above,
note 43). His knowledge of legislative science enables him to educate his
citizens in accordance with the human good even in regimes which promote
ends conflicting with that good.
Our purpose has been to reconstruct the political framework of Aristode's
mord philosophy. In dividing his account of politike into separate works,
he does not seek to establish "ethics" as an autonomous science, but to
account for the variety of regimes in which moral education takes place. In
his "discourses on the regimes," as we have seen, Aristotle planned to
explain the relation between these two works by reconsidering the topics
treated in the EN and Pol. 1 in light of the divergent ends and ways of life
promoted by the various forms of regime. Let us now turn to consider the
implications of this plan for interpretation of one aspect of Aristotle's
ethical writings, his account of moral virtue.
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It is not controversial that an individual's views about the human good
are decisively informed by the laws, customs and educational programs of
his regime. What is most striking about Aristotle's position, however, and
what has gone entirely unnoticed in the scholarship, is that justice and the
moral virtues vary according to the end promoted by the regime in force.
Since the "discourses on the regimes" are not extant, we lack the
comprehensive account of the relation between the virtues and the forms of
regime that Aristotle planned to provide here. But when discussing
deliberative oratory in Rhetoric 1. 8 he writes as follows (1365b21-66al6):
The greatest and most authoritative of all the means of persuasion and
of noble counsel is to know all the regimes and to distinguish the
customs, manners and advantage of each. For all men are persuaded by
what is advantageous, and that which preserves the regime is
advantageous. Moreover, the declaration of authority is authoritative,
for there are as many [forms of] authority as there are [forms of] regime.
And there are four [forms of] regime—democracy, oligarchy,
aristocracy and monarchy—so that the deciding authority is always a
part or the whole of one of these . . .
One should not neglect the end of each regime, for men make
choices with reference to the end. Now the end of democracy is liberty,
of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and the
laws, [ . . . ] and of tyranny self-preservation. It is clear, then, that
one must distinguish the customs, manners and advantage relating to
the end of each, since men choose with reference to this. But since
proofs are established not only by demonstrative but also by ethical
argvmient (for we trust one who appears to be of a certain sort
—
good or
well-intentioned or both), we would need to be acquainted with the
__
characters of each of the regimes, for with reference to each the
character most likely to persuade is that characteristic of it. These
characters will be grasped by the same means, for characters are
manifest in accordance with intentional choice, and intentional choice
has reference to the end.
Aristotle does not discuss the "character" of each of the forms of regime
in the extant Politics, but it is clear that this character decisively informs a
regime's way of life. At the outset of his account of the best regime's
educational program, Aristotle says "it is necessary to educate with a view
to each [form of] regime; for the special character of each regime both
customarily preserves the regime and establishes it in the beginning, for
example the democratic character democracy and the oligarchic character
oligarchy; and the best character is always the cause of a better regime"
(1337aI4-I8; cf. 1310al2-18). Aristotle ranks regimes according to their
character because this character reflects the partial or incomplete way in
which the various regimes promote the best way of life as elaborated in Pol.
7-8. Similarly, his account of justice and the other virtues depends on the
divergent ends promoted by the various regimes. In Pol. 5. 9 he says that a
ruler ought to possess virtue and justice: "in each regime the kind that is
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relative to the regime; for if justice is not the same in all regimes, there
must also necessarily be differences in [the virtue of] justice" (1309a36-39).
Thus not only the good citizen's justice but his other moral virtues as well
vary according to the end promoted by his regime (cf. 1276b30-33, 1284al-
3). In the extant Politics Aristotle does not spell out how the moral virtues
are adjusted to the ends of the various regimes.'*^ He does state, however,
that "[the virtue of] justice is a virtue characteristic of associations, and that
all the other virtues necessarily follow upon it" (1283a38^0). The other
virtues evidently follow upon justice because justice is perfect virtue not
simply but toward others and so in a sense is not a part of virtue but the
whole of virtue (cf. 1129bll-30al0).'*'' Hence the moral virtues depend
upon a regime's ends just as justice as a whole does. In short, the good
citizen's virtue varies according to his regime's end.
Aristotle provides some indication of how the moral virtues depend
upon the forms of regime in his account of the partial claims to justice
advanced by the democrats and oligarchs. Both parties agree that justice
consists in a certain kind of equahty, but the democrats suppose that those
who are equal in one respect, freedom, are equal simply, whereas the
oligarchs suppose that those who are unequal in another respect, wealth, are
unequal simply (cf. 1280a7-25, 1282bl6-83a22, 1301a25-b4). Both
parties, Aristotle argues in Pol. 3. 9, overlook the decisive consideration:
the end for which the city is constituted. If the city were constituted for the
sake of possessions, the oligarchs' argument would be strong; but since it is
rather constituted for a complete and self-sufficient life, for the sake not
merely of living together but of noble actions, the decisive consideration is
virtue. Both democratic justice and oligarchic justice only partially reflect
justice properly understood. And since the other moral virtues follow upon
inclusive or universal justice, democratic and oligarchic regimes presumably
educate their citizens according to an understanding of the human good as
partial as their principles of justice. A regime's character comes to light in
the laws it enacts to promote its ends, and this character is better the more
closely its ends, whether democratic, oligarchic or some other, correspond to
the human good (cf. 1310al2-18, 1337al4-18).
The fact that justice and the moral virtues vary according to a regime's
ends sharply underscores the importance of the political framework of
Aristotle's moral philosophy. In practice, the moral virtues always come to
light in a particular regime, whose perspective is partial to the extent that
its ends diverge from those of the best regime. The account of the moral
virtues presented in the ethical writings, accordingly, is incomplete
inasmuch as it abstracts from the political circumstances which in practice
always govern the individual's moral education—the "character," laws and
^ As W. L. Newman recognizes in his commentary (Oxford 1902) IV 403.
^^ On this subject see D. O'Connor, "The Aetiology of Justice," to appear in a volume
of essays on the Politics edited by C. Lord.
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educational programs of the various forms of regime. In fact, it is only in
the exceptional case of the best regime, which educates its citizens in
accordance with the natural hierarchy of human goods,'** that the moral
virtues appear just as they are presented in the ethical writings. In all
inferior regimes, they emerge in the partial perspective of ends which
diverge from the best way of life. But since all regimes educate their
citizens in accordance with the ends they promote, one who wishes to
employ legislative science to turn others towards virtue must understand
these inferior regimes in order to apply his knowledge of the human good
properly. It is only through the statesman's legislative science that the
political face of virtue in inferior regimes may somehow come to resemble
virtue properly understood. That is why, after all, the enquiry into polidke
that Aristotle begins in the EN is incomplete without the extant Politics
and the promised "discourses on the regimes."
Contrary to the near-universal assumption of modem scholarship, then,
Aristotle's teaching in the ethical writings emerges in its proper light only
within its political framework. The scholarly practice of reading the ethical
writings in isolation from the Politics has no foundation whatsoever in
Aristotle's thought. If we wish to understand his moral philosophy, we
must restore it to the political context in which it was originally conceived
and presented.
Duke University
*^ Or at least as far as is possible on the level of politics: see Vander Waerdt (above,
note 1) 84-85.

